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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2010, the Seattle Times began the first comprehensive 
accounting of adult family homes in Washington State.1 The six-part se-
ries, titled “Seniors for Sale,” reported that “[a]dult family homes in the 
state are seen as a national model, and in King County alone, they’ve 
become more plentiful than Starbucks stores. But the explosive growth, 
fueled by profiteers and a lack of careful state regulation, is leaving thou-
sands of people vulnerable to harm.”2 By September, the Times reported 
that it had uncovered at least 236 deaths indicating neglect or abuse.3 
Examples of the neglect and abuse uncovered in these homes in-
cluded the stories of Jean Rudolf and Clarence Yesland, who were eigh-
ty-seven and eighty-four years old, respectively.4 Jean Rudolph died 
from an infection caused by seven pressure sores, some of which were so 
deep that they left bone and muscle exposed.5 Doctors revealed that the 
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 1. Michael Berens, Special Reports: Seniors for Sale, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/seniorsforsale/. 
 2. Michael Berens, How the Aged and Frail are Exploited in Washington’s Adult Family 
Homes, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/seniorsforsale/201093 
9195_seniors31.html. 
 3. Michael Berens, Deaths in Adult Homes Hidden and Ignored, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2012856611_seniors12.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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wounds had gone untreated for weeks.6 Clarence Yesland suffered from a 
broken hip but was unable to communicate his pain due to dementia.7 
Narcotics prescribed by Clarence’s doctor could have dulled his pain; 
however, Clarence’s caretaker told members of his family that “the drug 
would hasten his death.”8 Clarence’s caretaker used this lie to cover up 
her theft of Clarence’s pills in order to sell them to a caregiver with a 
drug problem at a separate adult home.9 Without the investigative work 
of the Seattle Times, the public would not have learned of the stories of 
Jean or Clarence, or of the hundreds of deaths that resulted from similar 
instances of abuse across the state.10 
The public’s ignorance of this abuse is, in part, due to the fact that 
many of the long-term care (LTC) facilities in Washington have manda-
tory arbitration agreements in their admission contracts.11 Because arbi-
tration is confidential,12 if the representatives of neglected seniors wanted 
to hold these facilities accountable, their stories would be hidden from 
public view in the arbitration process.13 
In addition to avoiding reputation-damaging litigation, arbitration 
agreements offer multiple benefits over litigation for the LTC industry. 
Consider the example of deceased nursing home patient Henry Woodall. 
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sions packets”). 
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arbitrated. Estate of Eckstein ex rel. Luckey v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1235 
(E.D. Wash. 2009) (holding that the arbitration agreement between a nursing home and a former 
nursing home resident that was executed by the resident’s attorney-in-fact was valid and enforceable 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Washington Uniform Arbitration Act); Nail v. 
Consol. Health Care Fund I, 229 P.3d 885, 889 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the arbitration 
association’s policy statement, which provided that the association would no longer accept health 
care cases involving individual patients without a postdispute agreement to arbitrate, did not prec-
lude the enforcement of a nursing home resident’s predispute arbitration agreement); Woodall v. 
Avalon Care Ctr.-Federal Way, L.L.C., 231 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (upholding the 
arbitration agreement in a nursing home contract as valid and enforceable in a survival action 
brought by the heirs of a deceased nursing home patient). 
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In August 2010, the Washington Court of Appeals informed Henry’s 
heirs that Henry’s survival claims must be arbitrated under his agreement 
with the Avalon Care Center in Federal Way.14 As a result, Henry’s heirs 
must argue his case in front of an arbitration panel, which will likely be 
selected by the nursing home,15 rather than before a judge and jury. 
When Henry signed the arbitration agreement on the date of his admis-
sion, he unknowingly waived his constitutional right to a jury.16 In addi-
tion, Henry signed away his right to appeal the outcome of his case, as an 
arbitrator’s decision is almost always binding.17 Moreover, arbitration 
agreements often have damage caps, and even if they are not capped, the 
average damage award in arbitrated cases is 35% less than in nonarbi-
trated cases.18 While proponents of arbitration agreements argue that ar-
bitration leads to cost-savings and a quicker judgment,19 the nursing 
home industry usually realizes these benefits, not the residents and their 
families.20 
Many advocates for LTC patients have argued that Congress should 
prohibit the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in LTC contracts.21 
While a bill that addresses this issue, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, has been introduced into Congress, it is unclear if and when a vote 
will be held.22 In order to address immediate concerns, a few states, such 
as Illinois and New Jersey, have enacted state legislation prohibiting 
mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts.23 But courts 
                                                     
 14. Woodall, 231 P.3d at 1252. 
 15. Krasuski, supra note 11, at 267 (“[B]ecause the arbitration clauses are often drafted by 
nursing home attorneys, nursing homes have the opportunity to control the terms of the arbitration to 
favor themselves and disadvantage residents. The agreements may specify an industry-friendly arbi-
tration provider to administer the arbitration proceeding . . . .”). 
 16. Woodall, 231 P.3d at 1252 ¶ 73 (There was factual evidence that Henry “was completely 
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Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 
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 17. Lauren Gaffney, Note, The Circle of Assent: How “Agreement” Can Save Mandatory 
Arbitration in Long-Term Care Contracts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (2009) (“The arbitrator’s 
decision is almost always binding and cannot be appealed in court absent abuse of discretion.”). 
 18. Jessica Fargen, Nursing Home Residents Often Sign Away Rights to Sue, BOS. HERALD, 
Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.globalaging.org/elderrights/us/2010/Rights.htm (citing a study conducted 
by Aon Corp. for the American Health Care Association in 2009). 
 19. Russel Myles & Kelly Reese, Arbitration: Avoiding the Runaway Jury, 23 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 129, 137–38 (1999). 
 20. Krasuski, supra note 11, at 293 (“Arbitration has been found to be more expensive for 
consumers than litigation, and its often-prohibitive fees, or forum costs, may serve to bar consumers 
from pursuing claims at all.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Laura K. Bailey, Note, The Demise of Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care 
Contracts, 75 MO. L. REV. 181, 182 (2010). 
 22. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
 23. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-101–3A-101 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-8.1 (West 2003). 
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recently struck down both statutes due to incompatibility with the Feder-
al Arbitration Act (FAA).24 The FAA preempts any state law that disfa-
vors the enforcement of arbitration agreements.25 But state laws that 
merely govern the procedures of arbitration are outside the FAA’s 
preemptive scope.26 Thus, while a similar statute has not been enacted in 
Washington, courts will likely find that the FAA preempts any statute 
attempting to prohibit rather than regulate arbitration agreements. 
This Comment explores the problems associated with the use of 
mandatory arbitration agreements in LTC contracts and proposes that 
Washington legislators regulate arbitration procedures in consumer arbi-
trations in a manner similar to legislation adopted in California. Part II of 
this Comment provides a brief history of arbitration agreements in the 
United States. It also discusses the increasing use of mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements in the LTC context. Part III examines the current ap-
proaches to challenging mandatory arbitration and ultimately concludes 
that these approaches are inadequate to address the problems presented 
by mandatory arbitration agreements in LTC contracts. Part IV proposes 
a new approach to controlling these agreements in LTC contracts in 
Washington—regulating the procedures of arbitration by requiring arbi-
tration companies to report information about consumer claims they ad-
minister. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has taken “a bipolar approach to arbitration” 
throughout its history.27 Although the Court traditionally rejected the use 
of arbitration agreements, the current Court is a strong supporter of arbi-
tration, even where it is mandatory.28 As such, mandatory arbitration 
agreements have become the status quo in a variety of settings, including 
LTC admission contracts.29 
A. History of Arbitration in the United States and Washington 
Until 1925, courts generally disfavored the use of predispute man-
datory arbitration agreements.30 Many courts found these contract clauses 
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Brookdale Living Cmtys. Inc., 1 A.3d 806, 818 (N.J. 2010). 
 25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
 26. See generally id. 
 27. Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1023. 
 28. Id. at 1024; see also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (validating 
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 29. Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1024–25. 
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for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2001). 
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unenforceable and considered them revocable at will.31 The rejection of 
arbitration agreements may have been a response to the fact that these 
agreements would “oust the courts of jurisdiction.”32 In 1925, however, 
court opinion shifted in favor of arbitration agreements as a result of 
Congress’s enactment of the FAA.33 The FAA expressed congressional 
support of alternative dispute resolution and confirmed the valid and en-
forceable nature of arbitration agreements.34 Section 2 of the FAA pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.35 
The courts have interpreted the FAA as manifesting a “liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration agreements.”36 The Supreme Court de-
termined that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its commerce au-
thority and therefore gave courts broad preemptive power over state laws 
disfavoring arbitration.37 Following the enactment of the FAA, many 
states consented to the federal government’s endorsement of arbitra-
tion.38 For instance, Washington legislators have since adopted their own 
version of the FAA, known as the Uniform Arbitration Act.39 
The Court’s opinion regarding enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments has not always been consistent. In 1953, court opinion shifted 
away from the liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements when the 
Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan.40 In Wilko, the Court refused to 
                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1026 (“Traditional ‘judicial jealousies’ of the arbitral forum led 
to the rejection of arbitration agreements that would ‘oust the courts of jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Amy 
J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements by Curing Bipolar Avoidance of 
Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2004)). 
 33. Alderman, supra note 30, at 1243. 
 34. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Alderman, supra note 30, at 1244 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 37. Krasuski, supra note 11, at 271–72. 
 38. Katherine Palm, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: 
Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L.J. 453, 457 (2006). 
 39. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04A (2005). 
 40. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480–82 (1989). 
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enforce the arbitration agreement between an investor and a brokerage 
house, holding that the “Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the 
disadvantages under which buyers labor.”41 Moreover, the Court found 
that it was “inappropriate to find that the customer had knowingly se-
lected arbitration” because the sellers had more information available to 
them than the buyer.42 But in 1989, the Supreme Court changed course 
one more time and overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express.43 The Court held that Wilko was “incorrectly de-
cided” and was “inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of 
other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements,” which favors 
arbitration.44 Since its decision in Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court has 
upheld the use of arbitration agreements in a variety of settings, includ-
ing commercial and employment disputes, as well as claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.45 In a recent decision from April 2011, 
the Court went so far as to validate arbitration clauses containing class-
action waivers in consumer contracts.46 This decision may motivate 
companies to add these clauses to their consumer contracts in order to 
avoid class actions. 
While arbitration and litigation are somewhat similar, there are sig-
nificant differences that exist between them. First, arbitration agreements 
often limit the scope of discovery and the rules of evidence.47 While it 
may not always be the case that there is less extensive discovery in arbi-
tration, “it is certainly true that many arbitration clauses on their face 
either restrict or ban discovery.”48 Second, unlike in litigation, where 
losing parties have a right to appeal the judgment, arbitration decisions 
are “almost always binding on the parties.”49 The losing party cannot 
appeal the arbitrator’s decision in court unless there is a “gross miscar-
riage of justice” or “manifest disregard of the law.”50 Third, while infor-
mation about court proceedings and awards is normally available to the 
                                                     
 41. Id. at 435. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480–82. 
 44. Id. at 484. 
 45. Palm, supra note 38, at 458. 
 46. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 47. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration: An Assessment and Call 
for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 370–71 (1995). 
 48. Palm, supra note 38, at 478 n.172. 
 49. Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1026. 
 50. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 412 (3d ed. 
2005). 
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public, arbitration hearings are often confidential.51 Finally, arbitration 
agreements often cap compensatory and punitive damages.52 
Parties to a business-to-business contract may find that arbitration 
offers a number of benefits over litigation in handling contract disputes. 
For example, because parties may choose to be bound by limited discov-
ery, arbitration can be less burdensome.53 In addition, the confidentiality 
of arbitration may protect businesses from negative press attention and 
preserve the businesses’ reputations. Arbitration may also help maintain 
long-term business relationships because it is often viewed as less adver-
sarial.54 Moreover, these agreements are substantively and procedurally 
fair because both parties generally are equally sophisticated and have an 
equal amount of bargaining power.55 
B. Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Contracts 
While arbitration agreements are not inherently problematic, many 
critics argue that arbitration agreements are inherently unfair in consum-
er contracts.56 First, consumer advocates argue that unlike in business-to-
business contracts, the consumer has no meaningful choice of whether to 
arbitrate claims because of the disparate bargaining power between an 
individual and an organization.57 In fact, one senator raised this concern 
prior to the enactment of the FAA, and proponents answered “that the 
FAA was not intended to cover arbitration agreements offered on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees.”58 Second, critics 
challenge the assumption that arbitration costs less than litigation.59 For 
example, one study by a consumer lobbying group found that “total fo-
rum costs incurred by a plaintiff’s use of the American Arbitration Asso-
                                                     
 51. BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO ADR, supra note 12 (“Arbitration, Mediation and other forms of 
ADR are generally not open to public scrutiny like disputes settled in court. The hearings and awards 
are kept private and confidential, which helps to preserve positive working relationships.”). 
 52. LOWENFELD, supra note 50; see also Suzanne Gallagher, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in 
Nursing Home Admission Agreements: The Rights of Elders, 3 NAELA J. 187, 198 (2007). 
 53. LOWENFELD, supra note 50, at 411 (“Indeed it has been suggested that the series of proar-
bitration decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court may be in part attributable to the Court’s search for 
alternatives to a litigation process that has become overwhelmed by discovery.”). 
 54. KATHRYN HELNE NICKERSON, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL FOR INDUS. & SEC., 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2005), http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html. 
 55. See Alderman, supra note 30, at 1247–48 (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc, 
161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960)) (“The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who 
are brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate 
economic equality.”). 
 56. See id. at 1240–42. 
 57. Id. at 1240. 
 58. Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1029 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 59. Palm, supra note 38, at 476–77 (noting the results of a study suggesting that “in the vast 
majority of cases, arbitration will necessarily increase the transaction costs of litigation”). 
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ciation in an $80,000 claim could increase by as much as $6,650, or 
3,009%, as compared with filing in Cook County, Illinois.”60 Third, 
mandatory arbitration agreements can preclude consumers from litigating 
their claims in a class action.61 Finally, arbitration eliminates the poten-
tial for any favorable precedent or law reform that could otherwise de-
velop through litigation.62 
In an attempt to address a number of the problems surrounding 
mandatory arbitration of consumer contracts, lawmakers introduced the 
Arbitration Fairness Act into Congress in 2009.63 The Act proposes the 
following change in the “Validity and Enforcement” provision of Section 
3 of the FAA: “No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or en-
forceable if it requires arbitration of—(1) an employment, consumer, or 
franchise dispute . . . .”64 While it is difficult to determine the likelihood 
that the proposed legislation will pass, a similar bill was introduced in 
2007 and never became law.65 While the proposed legislation marks a 
significant step in attempting to curb the use of arbitration agreements in 
consumer contracts, it is unknown how long it will be before Congress 
provides an answer on the matter. 
C. Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care 
Contracts in Washington 
Within the last decade, LTC providers have “substantially increased 
their use of arbitration provisions” in admission contracts with new resi-
dents.66 While the exact number of nursing homes that use mandatory 
arbitration agreements is unknown, binding arbitration has seemingly 
become the norm in LTC admission contracts across the country.67 In 
fact, “most of the nation’s largest nursing home chains” have been found 
to include arbitration agreements in their admission contracts.68 
                                                     
 60. See id. at 477 (citing the results of a study conducted by Public Citizen, a national nonprofit 
organization founded by Ralph Nader in the early 1970s that is dedicated to representing consumer 
interests and rights). See generally About Public Citizen, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
about (last visited June 29, 2011). 
 61. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 62. Consumers generally lack the resources or political power to effectively lobby the legisla-
ture for meaningful reform. The civil justice system, however, has long been fertile ground for the 
establishment of consumer rights. Predispute mandatory arbitration, by precluding access to the 
courts, frustrates the implementation of existing consumer rights and effectively precludes the de-
velopment of new ones. Alderman, supra note 30, at 1263–64. 
 63. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 64. Id. § 4. 
 65. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http:// 
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1782is.txt.pdf. 
 66. Bailey, supra note 21, at 186. 
 67. Id. at 187. 
 68. Krasuski, supra note 11, at 268. 
2011] Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in LTC Contracts 221 
Increased use of the agreements is one of a number of indications 
that arbitration provides significant benefits to nursing homes. Another 
indication is that some nursing home chains will even pay residents’ ar-
bitration fees.69 One particular story of a nursing home chain in Florida 
further illustrates the eagerness of the LTC industry to obtain the benefits 
of binding arbitration. According to the attorney for one of the plaintiffs, 
the nursing home chain devised a plan to sell its twelve homes with the 
purpose of forcing residents to sign new admission contracts containing 
arbitration agreements.70 Even though the nursing home chain’s attorney 
argued that the sale was intended to lower the value of the assets of the 
chain and thus decrease the monetary incentive to sue the chain, the sale 
nonetheless demonstrates that LTC providers are anxious to avoid litiga-
tion.71 
One of the benefits that arbitration offers nursing homes is the op-
portunity to control the terms of arbitration. For this reason, LTC provid-
ers or their attorneys often write the arbitration agreements in LTC con-
tracts.72 As a result, binding arbitration agreements allow LTC providers 
to write the terms of arbitration in their favor.73 The arbitration agree-
ment in Henry Woodall’s contract with Avalon Care Center in Federal 
Way74 typifies LTC arbitration agreements: 
We agree to submit to binding arbitration for all disputes and claims 
for damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the 
medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the 
date of this Agreement. All alleged claims for monetary damages 
against the facility, its owners, lessees, management organization, 
or their employees, officers, directors, agents, must be arbitrated in-
cluding, without limitation, claims for personal injury from alleged 
negligence, gross negligence, malpractice, or any alleged claims 
based on any departure from accepted medical or health care or 
safety standards, emotional distress or punitive damages. 
. . . . 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons 
whose alleged claims for injuries or losses arise out of care rendered 
by the Facility or which should have been rendered by Facility after 
                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 267. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See supra Part I. 
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the date of this Agreement, including any spouse, children, or heirs 
of the Resident or Executor of the Resident’s estate.75 
While the length and content of these agreements vary, this agree-
ment is a fair representation of what standard arbitration agreements look 
like in an LTC contract.76 At a minimum, these agreements generally 
waive the right to a jury trial.77 Some arbitration clauses, like the one 
quoted above, attempt to limit the LTC provider’s liability even further 
by binding the heirs and assigns of residents to arbitration, precluding 
wrongful death claims by residents’ families. In this particular case, the 
Washington Court of Appeals held that heirs are not required to arbitrate 
their wrongful death claims where they were not parties to the agreement 
to arbitrate.78 But alternative state jurisdictions where Avalon’s ancillary 
services are located may find that these agreements are binding and en-
forceable.79 Given that Avalon has ancillary services in Utah, Arizona, 
California, and Hawaii,80 Avalon could insert a clause, as LTC providers 
have done in other states, “requiring arbitration to take place in a distant 
state, presenting another barrier to residents and other plaintiffs.”81 
Proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that there are a number 
of policy reasons for favoring arbitration over litigation in the LTC con-
text. First, proponents argue that arbitration is necessary for LTC provid-
ers to be able to avoid bankruptcy because nursing homes are facing in-
creasing liability premiums as a result of an increase in litigation and 
large damage awards.82 One study found that since 1996, the “annual rate 
                                                     
 75. Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Federal Way, L.L.C., 231 P.3d 1252, 1254–55 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 76. For more examples, see Gaffney, supra note 17, at 1025. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Woodall, 231 P.3d at 1254. 
 79. Different jurisdictions have provided different answers to this question. See, e.g., Briarcliff 
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 2004); Herbert v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 
Rptr. 477 (1985); Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 327 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. 1982) (explaining 
that a wrongful death action is derivative, and a representative stands in the shoes of the decedent so 
that the arbitration agreement is binding on the personal representative in a subsequent wrongful 
death action); Trinity Mission Health & Rehab. of Clinton v. Estate of Scott ex rel. Johnson, 19 So. 
3d 735 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that an arbitration provision, which stated that “[t]he Resident 
and Responsible Party agree that any and all claims, disputes, and/or controversies between them 
and the Facility or its owners . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration,” encompassed a wrongful 
death action brought by the deceased resident’s daughter, as the claim arose out of the care that the 
nursing facility agreed to provide in the contract). 
 80. “Avalon is a group of related companies that provide health care and ancillary services in 
Utah, Arizona, California, Washington, and Hawaii.” Corporate Information, AVALON HEALTH 
CARE GRP., http://www.avalonhci.com/corporate_information.html (last visited June 26, 2011). 
 81. Krasuski, supra note 11, at 269 (An Oklahoma nursing home’s arbitration agreement re-
quires residents to travel to New Mexico at their own expense for arbitration; a Florida nursing 
home’s arbitration agreement requires that arbitration take place in Alabama.). 
 82. Palm, supra note 38, at 473–75. 
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of claims against long-term care facilities has more than doubled.”83 Pro-
ponents argue that the rise in litigation costs results in a “decrease in the 
quality of treatment that long-term care providers can afford to offer.”84 
Second, proarbitration advocates argue the confidential nature of arbitra-
tion “is beneficial to the nursing home industry because people will not 
be deterred from entering nursing homes based on the media’s reporting 
of substandard care provided by the facilities.”85 Finally, the proarbitra-
tion perspective maintains that a cheaper and faster forum could make 
the pursuit of claims more affordable and accessible, potentially reducing 
“the outcome-determinative quality arising out of the financial disparity 
between plaintiffs and defendant corporations.”86 
Conversely, opponents of mandatory arbitration argue that these 
agreements do not belong in the LTC context. First, they argue that these 
agreements are unconscionable because long-term care often occurs in 
response to unexpected and sudden need. As a result, residents and their 
families are often forced to take the first opening they can find.87 Second, 
critics argue that the confidential nature of arbitration “decreases public 
awareness” of problems in LTC facilities and weakens “the ability of the 
citizenry to function as a driving force of public policy change.”88 Also, 
the lack of information weakens the state’s ability to regulate these facili-
ties. Third, opponents dispute that arbitration is cheaper and faster than 
litigation.89 One study suggested that “‘in the vast majority of cases, arbi-
tration will necessarily increase the transaction costs of litigation.’”90 
Finally, critics of mandatory arbitration argue that arbitration often does 
not provide for a neutral decision-maker.91 For example, some arbitration 
agreements provide that the nursing home is entitled to select the arbitra-
tors.92 Thus, LTC providers are in a position to benefit from an industry 
                                                     
 83. Id. at 474. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Bailey, supra note 21, at 181 (citing Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful Death 
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“repeat-player advantage” because arbitrators have an economic incen-
tive to provide a favorable outcome for the LTC provider.93 
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO CHALLENGING 
COMPELLED ARBITRATION 
Currently, two approaches are being utilized to challenge the use of 
arbitration agreements in LTC contracts: litigation and legislation. The 
first approach attempts to identify a remedy under traditional contract 
theories, and the second focuses on creating a broad remedy by enacting 
more favorable state laws.94 Recent case law illustrates the inadequacies 
of the first approach in addressing the problems posed by arbitration 
agreements in LTC contracts.95 While the second approach provides the 
best option for protecting seniors from mandatory arbitration, the most 
recent legislative attempts to combat compelled arbitration have failed.96 
A. First Approach: Litigation 
Case law regarding arbitration agreements in the LTC context is a 
fairly new development nationwide. The first case to reach a state appel-
late court on the issue was in South Carolina in 1993.97 In Washington, 
there are only three reported cases that address the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements in nursing home contracts. The earliest case is from 
June 2009, and the other two are from March and May 2010.98 But the 
“sunshine retirement states” like Florida and California, which generate 
the majority of case law on the issue,99 provide a fairly good indication 
of the approaches utilized by parties challenging compelled arbitration. 
Given that courts typically consider nursing home contracts to be 
“transactions involving ‘interstate commerce,’” the FAA will typically 
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govern arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts.100 Although 
plaintiffs have tried to argue that nursing home admission contracts do 
not constitute interstate commerce, the argument almost never suc-
ceeds.101 Section 2 of the FAA declares that arbitration provisions will be 
subject to invalidation only for the same grounds applicable to contrac-
tual provisions generally.102 Likewise, under Washington’s Uniform Ar-
bitration Act, an agreement to arbitrate is “valid, enforceable, and irre-
vocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of [a] contract.”103 As a result, courts will enforce arbitration 
agreements in LTC contracts in Washington unless the provision violates 
state contract law.104 
By far, the most common contract theory utilized to challenge arbi-
tration agreements in LTC contracts is unconscionability.105 Two plain-
tiffs in the three Washington cases concerning arbitration agreements in 
LTC contracts raised the issue of unconscionability.106 But the party at-
tempting to strike down a mandatory arbitration agreement is required to 
“present an exceedingly strong factual showing” that the agreement was 
either procedurally or substantively unfair.107 In Washington, “[a]n arbi-
tration agreement may be substantively unconscionable if it ‘triggers 
costs effectively depriving a plaintiff of limited pecuniary means of a 
forum for vindicating claims.’”108 Additionally, plaintiffs in Washington 
may prevail under the theory of procedural unconscionability by demon-
strating “a lack of meaningful choice.”109 But satisfying the demanding 
evidentiary standard is a difficult, if not insurmountable, task. 
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The case of Henry Woodall110 illustrates the difficult task of prov-
ing unconscionability.111 After rejecting Clifford’s (Henry’s son) subs-
tantive unconscionability claim, the Division I Court of Appeals consi-
dered the claim that the mandatory arbitration agreement in Henry Woo-
dall’s nursing home contract was procedurally unconscionable. The court 
explained that in determining whether an agreement is procedurally un-
conscionable, courts look to the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion at issue.112 The court said, “The circumstances include the manner in 
which the contract was entered, whether each party had a reasonable op-
portunity to understand the terms of the contract, and whether the terms 
were hidden in a maze of fine print.”113 
First, the court determined that the terms of the contract were not 
“hidden in a maze of fine print” and found a lack of evidence in the 
record from anyone with personal knowledge of “the manner in which 
the contract was entered.”114 Next, the court considered the question of 
whether Henry had a “reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of 
the contract.”115 Clifford’s claim was that Henry did not have the capaci-
ty to sign the arbitration agreement.116 Clifford presented the court with a 
declaration that stated that Henry “was completely deaf from a young 
age until the time of his death and the agreement could not have been 
explained to him verbally because he could not hear.”117 In addition, the 
declaration stated that Henry “did not have the mental ability to under-
stand anything he read,” and that “there is no way that he could have un-
derstood a document as complicated as the [arbitration] Agreement on 
[the date he signed it].”118 Clifford also submitted a statement by Dr. 
Glass, a physician qualified to diagnose dementia, who said Henry 
“could not have understood this agreement . . . . [It] is beyond [Henry’s] 
level of comprehension.”119 The court, however, held “the evidence did 
not show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Henry lacked 
the capacity to execute the [arbitration] agreement.”120 Thus, the court 
held that Henry’s arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable.121 
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Other jurisdictions are also hostile to the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility. For example, the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida en-
forced an arbitration agreement despite the plaintiff’s claim that his 
mother was legally blind when she signed her nursing home contract.122  
The court held that “[n]o party to a written contract in [Florida] can de-
fend against its enforcement on the sole ground that he signed it without 
reading it.”123 While a few unconscionability challenges across the coun-
try have prevailed, “the vast majority have failed.”124 In any event, “cha-
racterizing mandatory arbitration agreements as a destruction of rights 
seems to be a waste of energy”125 in an environment like Washington, 
where congressional and judicial support for arbitration remains strong. 
Therefore, because arbitration is still strongly supported in Washington 
State, litigation is an inadequate tool for combating compelled arbitration 
in nursing home contracts. 
B. Second Approach: Legislation 
The legislative approach aims to find a broader remedy for the 
problem, particularly for individuals who are unable to offer sufficient 
evidence of unconscionability or succeed on other contract theories. Cur-
rent legislative approaches have attempted to either enact state laws pro-
hibiting arbitration agreements in LTC contracts or to adopt model or 
uniform arbitration agreements for LTC providers. But courts have re-
cently rejected such efforts as a violation of the FAA. Thus, these ap-
proaches do not offer a viable solution for nursing home residents in 
Washington. 
Illinois attempted to address the problems associated with the use of 
arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts by enacting a state law 
that prohibited them. In 1988, Illinois state legislature enacted the Nurs-
ing Home Care Act (NHCA).126 The NHCA provided that “[a]ny waiver 
by a resident or his legal representative of the right to commence an ac-
tion under Sections 3-601 through 3-607, whether oral or in writing, shall 
be null and void, and without legal force or effect.”127 In April 2010, 
however, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the NHCA provision is 
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preempted by the FAA.128 The court noted that the FAA states that any 
arbitration agreement shall be enforced “save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”129 Further, the 
court held that the “public policy behind the antiwaiver provisions of 
sections 3-606 and 3-607 of the Nursing Home Care Act are not grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract within the 
meaning of section 2 of the FAA.”130 
Likewise, in 1976, New Jersey enacted the Nursing Home Respon-
sibilities and Rights of Residents Act. The Act rendered invalid and un-
enforceable “[a]ny provision or clause waiving or limiting the right to 
sue . . . between a patient and a nursing home.”131 But in August 2010, 
the Superior Court of New Jersey declared the provision invalid.132 The 
court held that “the FAA’s clear authorization nullifies the specific pro-
hibition of arbitration provisions in nursing home or assisted living facili-
ties’ contracts contained in N.J.S.A. 30:13-8.1.”133 Additionally, the court 
stated that “[o]ur State’s prohibition of arbitration agreements in nursing 
home contracts, designed to protect the elderly, is thus irreconcilable 
with our national policy favoring arbitration as a forum for dispute reso-
lution.”134 Therefore, these examples of failed legislation from Illinois 
and New Jersey illustrate that Washington courts will likely strike down 
any statute enacted in Washington purporting to limit the use of arbitra-
tion agreements in LTC contracts. 
California took an alternative legislative approach to addressing the 
problems raised from using arbitration agreements in LTC admission 
contracts. In 2006, California’s Department of Public Health (DPH) es-
tablished a Standard Admission Agreement that nursing homes were re-
quired to use.135 Critics of arbitration agreements argue that “standard 
nursing home admission agreements . . . improve procedural fairness by 
dictating how such provisions may be presented and ratified.”136 But use 
of the standardized agreement has been suspended since March 2007 due 
to a court order obtained by nursing home operators who challenged it.137 
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While the DPH announced that it is revising the Standard Admission 
Agreement to comply with the court order, most nursing homes are likely 
to use their own admission agreements until the DPH reissues the stan-
dard agreement.138 Although the viability of standard admission agree-
ments remains unsettled, standardization could potentially be a beneficial 
option for Washington. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR WASHINGTON: REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS 
The most effective way to address the issues surrounding arbitra-
tion agreements in the LTC context in Washington is from a practical, 
policy-based perspective. Given that arbitration is a likely forum for dis-
pute resolution between elderly residents and LTC providers, reform ef-
forts should be directed toward ensuring that the arbitration forum is 
more fair and equitable. While it is clear that any state law that disfavors 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in nursing home admission 
contracts will be preempted by the FAA, state laws that govern the pro-
cedures of arbitration but do not affect its enforcement are outside the 
Act’s preemptive scope.139 Thus, Washington could address a number of 
the problems posed by arbitration in the nursing home context by imple-
menting government regulation of arbitration procedures. 
Washington should consider adopting a statute requiring arbitration 
companies to report information about consumer claims they adminis-
ter,140 which is similar to the law adopted in California. The California 
law currently serves to address the problems presented by the secrecy of 
arbitration in the LTC context as well the repeat-player problem.141 
These procedures, however, are far from perfect and fail to address other 
problems, such as the lack of an appeal process and damage caps. Still, 
they provide for a forum that is less slanted in favor of LTC providers by 
allowing for public accountability of private arbitrations.142 
A. California’s Reporting Requirements for 
Consumer Arbitrations 
In 2003, California enacted California Code of Civil Procedure Sec-
tion 1281.96, requiring private arbitration companies to collect and pro-
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vide specified data regarding the type, quantity, and certain particulars of 
consumer arbitrations they administer.143 The pertinent portion of the 
statute reads as follows: 
[A]ny private arbitration company that administers or is otherwise 
involved in, a consumer arbitration, shall collect, publish at least 
quarterly, and make available to the public in a computer-searchable 
format, which shall be accessible at the Internet Web site of the pri-
vate arbitration company, if any, and on paper upon request, all of 
the following information regarding each consumer arbitration with-
in the preceding five years: 
(1) The name of the nonconsumer party, if the nonconsumer party is 
a corporation or other business entity. 
. . . . 
(3) Whether the consumer or nonconsumer party was the prevailing 
party. 
(4) On how many occasions, if any, the nonconsumer party has pre-
viously been a party in an arbitration or mediation administered by 
the private arbitration company. 
. . . . 
(7) The type of disposition of the dispute, if known, including with-
drawal, abandonment, settlement, award after hearing, award with-
out hearing, default, or dismissal without hearing. 
(8) The amount of the claim, the amount of the award, and any other 
relief granted, if any. 
(9) The name of the arbitrator, his or her total fee for the case, and 
the percentage of the arbitrator’s fee allocated to each party.144 
The legislative history of the statute reveals that one of the argu-
ments asserted by proponents of the law was that it would serve to ad-
dress the repeat-player problem.145 Proponents said that “the bill is de-
signed to reduce incentives to favor corporate parties, and to help address 
mounting public skepticism about the fairness of such arbitrations.”146 
The Consumers Union argued: 
[This law would] provide greater accountability for arbitration pro-
vider organizations by requiring them to plainly disclose to the pub-
lic information such as the number of arbitrations handled for a par-
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ticular business and the outcome of those arbitrations. Consumers 
deserve to know how many other cases a private judging company 
such as the American Arbitration Association [AAA] has handled 
for a particular business . . . and whether the business or the con-
sumer won most of those cases.147 
Before enacting the statute, California legislators rejected argu-
ments made by the California Dispute Resolution Council that the costs 
associated with the proposed reporting duty would “impose a hardship on 
JAMS [Judicial Arbitration Mediation Services] and any community 
based programs respectively because these providers do not currently 
collect or collate this information.”148 Legislators also rejected the argu-
ment that “arbitration companies are being required inappropriately to 
act as public reporting agencies.”149 Instead, legislators agreed with con-
sumer advocates who argued that “problems of unfair processes are more 
acute today than ever because mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
have proliferated in consumer contracts ranging from credit cards and 
telephone service to home loans, health care and consumer goods.”150 
B. Effects of Adopting Similar Legislation in Washington 
Currently, private arbitration companies like JAMS are able to keep 
disputes between families and LTC providers in Washington hidden 
from the public.151 For instance, Washington residents are unable to learn 
about the injuries suffered by Henry Woodall152 and about the claim 
made on behalf of Henry’s estate against the Avalon Care Center of Fed-
eral Way (Avalon).153 Residents are unable to determine whether the 
Woodall family was awarded damages and, if so, how much.154 Assum-
ing JAMS arbitrated the claim, residents are unable to research how 
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many times Avalon has used JAMS’s services in the past or how many 
times Avalon was successful in those prior arbitrations.155 Residents are 
also unable to learn about which arbitrators Avalon used in the Woodall 
dispute, and how many times Avalon has previously won before those 
particular arbitrators.156 By adopting a reporting requirement statute for 
consumer arbitrations like the one adopted in California, families in 
Washington would have access to this currently confidential informa-
tion.157 
Providing Washington residents with this currently confidential in-
formation is consistent with public policy and will accomplish two objec-
tives. First, reporting requirements for consumer arbitrations will benefit 
LTC residents and Washington citizens by increasing public awareness 
about possible problems with LTC facilities, and will allow for govern-
ment oversight of LTC facilities.158 By eliminating the secrecy of con-
sumer arbitrations, the private arbitration process could no longer be 
used to hide abuse and neglect from the public. The need for public over-
sight is particularly great in the nursing home context because “[n]ursing 
homes are largely publicly funded by our tax dollars through Medicare 
and Medicaid programs and should not be permitted to use arbitration in 
efforts to curb public scrutiny.”159 Second, enacting a statute similar to 
California’s would improve the chance that the arbitration forum will be 
more fair and equitable to LTC residents and their families. As the pro-
ponents of the California law noted, the reporting requirements are de-
signed to reduce arbitrators’ incentives to favor corporate parties by al-
lowing for public accountability.160 
V. CONCLUSION 
As aging baby boomers begin planning for long-term care, the is-
sues surrounding the long-term care industry are likely to intensify. All 
taxpayers will bear the costs of substandard care, as injured residents will 
likely turn to Medicare and Medicaid to pay for their injuries.161 Thus, it 
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is imperative that Washington takes steps to protect the rights of seniors 
and ensure that nursing home residents are provided with adequate care. 
Mandatory arbitration agreements are against public policy because 
the confidential nature of arbitration proceedings decreases public 
awareness and impedes government oversight of abuse and misconduct 
in nursing homes. The Seattle Times special report on abuse in adult fam-
ily homes illustrated how public awareness about problems with LTC 
facilities serves as a driving force for public policy change. Following 
the Seattle Times investigative reports, Washington Governor Christine 
Gregoire ordered DSHS to review its oversight of the adult-home indus-
try.162 By April 2010, DSHS had “recommended nearly a dozen new 
laws and launched reforms to rein in the growing industry.”163 
In addition to being against public policy, mandatory arbitration 
agreements are unfair to residents and their families. Mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements require seniors to give up their right to a jury trial and 
their right to an appeal. Moreover, arbitration is generally an unfavorable 
forum for residents and their families because nursing home corporations 
can draft the terms of arbitration and select arbitrators to benefit them-
selves. Also, damages are often capped, and even if they are not, they are 
often significantly lower than at trial. 
Congress should act swiftly to prohibit mandatory arbitration 
agreements in LTC contracts by enacting the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009.164 In the meantime, the Washington legislature should consider 
more immediate solutions to protect the rights of seniors. Approaching 
the issue from a practical, policy-based perspective is the most effective 
way to achieve this goal. 
Because the FAA will preempt any state law that attempts to prohi-
bit arbitration, arbitration must be accepted as a likely forum for handling 
disputes between residents and LTC providers. Hence, efforts should be 
directed toward improving the fairness of this forum. Because the regula-
tion of arbitration procedures is outside the preemptive scope of the 
FAA, Washington should consider adopting a statute that regulates arbi-
tration by requiring arbitration companies to report information about the 
consumer claims they administer. While this regulation would not ad-
dress all of the issues surrounding arbitration, it will protect seniors from 
poor treatment by increasing public oversight of the LTC industry. 
Moreover, it will reduce arbitrators’ incentives to favor corporate parties, 
thereby improving the chance that the arbitration forum will be more fair 
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and equitable. By enacting these proposed reforms, Washington legisla-
tors will ensure that the cries for help from those abused in LTC facilities 
are not stifled by mandatory arbitration agreements. 
